The sound of Spanish

I was listening to a Paulina Rubio CD the other day. (Yes, yes. I know. Shame on me. Not only am I listening to pop music, but to Latin American pop music. So shoot me.) Her voice, husky, wonderfully and delightfully impudent, made me realize for the first time that the Spanish language can sound sexy as well. Until now I had a very low opinion on the sound of Spanish. Portuguese is pure delight for my ear; French is tolerable; but for Spanish and Italian I had nothing but disdain. Their vowels are too simple, ordinary, commonplace, hiding nothing and leaving nothing to the imagination. They make both languages sound like long strings of short syllables, rattled off in rapid succession, and their effect on the ear is not at all impressive. Well, I'm glad to say that Paulina's singing is making me change my opinion on Spanish somewhat. I now see that it can indeed sound good. But I still think that in the mouth of the average speaker, it has a deplorable tendency to sound ridiculous; it always gives me the feeling that the pronunciation must have acquired some kind of pomposity, probably some time back in their 16th-century golden age, and even after all these centuries it is still pronounced as if the speaker was taking himself much too seriously amd pompously.

Needless to say I haven't got the slightest knowledge of any of these languages, I'm just discussing the way they sound. (By the way, I've always been of the opinion that it is certainly both easier and more fun to issue pompous pronouncements on something that you don't know much about than on something you know well.)

KNJIGA: Jera Vodušek Starič, "Prevzem oblasti"

Jera Vodušek Starič: Prevzem oblasti 1944-1946. Cankarjeva založba, Ljubljana 1992. 8636108055. 456 str.

Tole knjigo sem pred nekaj meseci opazil v Konzorciju, kjer je bila naprodaj za pičlih 1900 tolarjev. Vedno znova občudujem naše založnike, da sploh uspejo preživeti, če jim knjige po trinajst let ležijo v skladiščih, pa še potem jih morajo prodajati skoraj zastonj, da se jih znebijo. Sicer pa to še ni najhujši primer; letos sem na Dnevih knjige kupil Trdinove Podobe prednikov iz leta 1987 za 500 tolarjev.

Kakorkoli že, zdelo se mi je, da bi Prevzem oblasti načeloma utegnil biti zanimiv. Vem, da so komunisti ob koncu vojne prevzeli oblast, radoveden pa sem bil, kakšne so bile podrobnosti tega prevzema, kakšni so tisti drobni posamezni koraki, iz katerih je takšna stvar verjetno sestavljena. Malo me je sicer skrbelo, če je knjiga nepristranska ali ne; nekako megleno se mi dozdeva, da je tam v letih 1990, 1991 in tam okoli iz vseh mogočih lukenj prilezlo na dan nezaslišano število vsakovrstnih desničarjev in začelo strašansko prizadevno objavljati svoje blodnje. Potem pa sem se zavedel, da pravzaprav, tudi če ta knjiga udriha po komunistih, me to ne bo nič motilo niti me ne bo moglo pripraviti k temu, da bi kaj spremenil svoje mnenje o njih; blagodeti komunizma se mi pač zdijo dovolj velike, da ga bom v vsakem primeru podpiral. Komunistom pa ne zamerim tega, da so počenjali grozodejstva, pač pa le to, da komunizma v resnici niso uvedli, ampak so stanje v državi sčasoma tako zavozili, da so bili ljudje v svoji nespameti in nezadovoljstvu navsezadnje pripravljeni pristati celo na vrnitev v kapitalizem, čeprav bi drugače trezen razmislek pokazal, da je ta sistem v vseh pogledih slabši od komunizma. Kakorkoli že, knjiga je bila tudi tako poceni, da sem si rekel, da bom pripravljen pač malo tvegati, in sem jo kupil. Ob branju sem ugotovil, da je pravzaprav zelo trezno napisana in ji ne morem očitati nikakršne pristranskosti, tako da sem tudi po tej plati čisto zadovoljen.

Ima pa ta knjiga eno drugo veliko napako, namreč da je zelo podrobna in temu primerno strahovito dolgočasna. Sestavljena je več ali manj iz dolgega zaporedja dejstev, ki povedo, kaj je ob tej, oni ali tretji priložnosti napisal, rekel ali storil ta, oni ali tretji človek, organ, odbor, itd. Ugotovil sem, da me toliko podrobnosti (in tako nizkonivojskih) pravzaprav ne zanima, zato sem knjigo bral z veliko hitrostjo, da bi se dogajanje vsaj malo hitreje odvijalo; tako je seveda večina podrobnosti šla mimo mene, brez da bi se mi kaj globlje usidrala v spominu. Pa saj se niti niso imele na kaj navezati; če bi hotel človek res pošteno preštudirati takšno knjigo, bi moral imeti nekaj več predznanja o zgodovini Jugoslavije pred in med drugo svetovno vojno. O pred- in medvojnih politikih govori tako, kot da je bralec pasel krave skupaj z njimi in so mu zato brez dvoma vsi do zadnjega pošteno domači; enako velja za politične stranke in vse mogoče take in drugačne državne organe, komiteje, odbore in podobne inštitucije, ki so za povrhu ponavadi predstavljeni tudi samo s kratico (na srečo je na koncu knjige slovar kratic). No, kljub temu sem naletel v tej knjigi na precej zanimih stvari.

Treba je priznati, da čim na prizorišče stopijo komunisti, so bizarnosti zagotovljene. Neverjetno je, s kakšnimi neumnostmi so znali ljudje priti na dan in se pri tem za povrhu celo jemati resno. Veliko takšnih primerov je pri njihovih pogledih na pravo in sodišča: „novo ali ljudsko sodstvo [...] je pravično in ne formalistično [...] Po novem naj bi presojanje temeljilo na čutu za pravičnost, ki je zasidran v ljudstvu in običajnem pravu“ (str. 12). Noro! Pa saj mora biti vendar vsakomur jasno, kakšen čut za pravičnost je zasidran v vsakem normalnem ljudstvu. To je prav tisti čut, ki nam je dal „oko za oko, zob za zob“, linčanje in podobne zadeve. To je isti čut, na katerega se vedno tako radi opirajo populistični politiki, ko predlagajo zviševanje kazni kot sredstvo za zmanjševanje kriminala, namesto da bi odpravljali vzroke zanj. Hvala lepa za tako pravičnost. Phe. Kdorkoli se poskuša sklicevati na čut za pravičnost, zasidran v ljudstvu, jasno pove, kaj hoče: hoče se izgovarjati na pobesnele, maščevalne in krvoželjne ljudske množice, da bo v njihovem imenu tem lažje masakriral svoje nasprotnike. Da ne govorimo o tem, s kako popolnim pomanjkanjem občutka za sramežljivost so uporabljali tu skoraj iste izraze kot nacisti le nekaj let poprej. Kaj vse se je v tretjem rajhu počenjalo v imenu “the healthy instincts of the people”. Tudi na ljudska sodišča so se že spomnili. No, na ljudska sodišča se je verjetno spomnil že tudi kdo drug pred njimi; vsakdo, ki so se mu zdeli pač običajni pravniki prepočasni in preveč sitni, pa se je zato pri klanju nasprotnikov raje oprl na ljudstvo in njegov zdravi občutek za pravičnost. Kar pa me pri vsej tej zgodbi z ljudskim sodstvom še najbolj živcira, je ta njihova preklemanska hinavščina. Meni je seveda popolnoma jasno, da se komunizma ne da vpeljati, brez da bi zatrl razne družbene sloje, ki mu nasprotujejo — bogataše, kapitaliste, klerikalce, reakcionarne kmete in malomeščane, itd. — prav, nimam nič proti; naj bi pač komunisti lepo naravnost povedali: teh in teh se mislimo znebiti, ker vidimo, da drugače ne gre, in naj bi jih postavili pred zid in postrelili; tega jim res ne bi mogel zameriti. Ta njihova salamenska hinavščina in nenehno opletanje z ljudskim čutom za pravičnost me pa prav res spravlja ob živce.

Kakorkoli že, na te podobnosti s fašističnim sodstvom je že takrat opozoril nek odvetnik Stanovnik. Boris Kidrič je to primerjavo zavrnil, „češ da je fašizem sodil ljudstvu, da pa ljudska oblast ni anarhija, ampak nadzor ljudstva nad organi oblasti, kar je »znak naše globoke demokracije«.“ (Str. 413-4.) Kakšno nakladanje! Kakšna hinavščina! Včasih se že sprašujem, če so ti ljudje nemara celo res verjeli v nebuloze, ki so jih takole brez prestanka širili.

Takšnih primerov o novih načelih v sodstvu je v knjigi še precej; str. 14, 44, 46, 382, 411-2. Večkrat se omenja tudi zgledovanje po sovjetskem sodstvu; str. 12, 16; pa načelo, „po katerem je ničen vsak pravni posel, ki nasprotuje skupnemu interesu“ (str. 46); „»[...] po ustavi najdoslednejše demokracije na svetu, t.j. po stalinski ustavi [...]«“ (str. 48). (Heh, sicer pa se na str. 97 vidi, da ko je govora o demokraciji, še posebej o resnični ali ljudski demokraciji, to praviloma pomeni oblast ljudstva, doseženo z revolucijo.)

Bizarno je tudi navodilo iz leta 1944: če razmere ne dopuščajo niti običajnega sodnega procesa niti sodbe v odsotnosti, „»so odgovorni faktorji upravičeni izvršiti kazen pred tako razpravo« in nato sodišču predložiti dokaze za naknadno sodbo“ (str. 25). Na str. 47-8 pa je omenjen razmislek z začetka 1945, da ni pametno prezgodaj uvesti predpisov s področja zasebnega prava, da se ne bodo kmetje prekmalu spet začeli prepirati in pravdati med sabo. Pravzaprav so z uvajanjem predpisov tudi sicer nalašč odlašali, tako da so lahko iniciativo prevzeli Ozna in izredna sodišča (str. 50).

Septembra 1943 so razglasili obvezno mobilizacijo v OF; „odtlej ni več mogoče govoriti o prostovoljnosti vstopa v NOG“ (str. 16). Tudi kasneje so pogosto označevali pasivnost, sredinskost in podobne zadeve kot problematične, takšne ljudi pa so razglašali za čakalce in špekulante (str. 96, 274). To me vsekakor živcira; grdo se mi zdi pričakovati od ljudi, da se bodo med vojno upirali okupatorjem in tako nosili svojo kožo naprodaj. Vsekakor je lepo, da so nekateri to pripravljeni početi, grdo pa se mi zdi pričakovati takšno junaštvo od vseh. To je skoraj tako grdo kot zahtevati od ljudi, da naj se pošteno obnašajo (npr. naj ne kradejo, četudi imajo priložnost za to); takšne reči preprosto niso v človekovi naravi. Grdo in nerealistično je zahtevati od ljudi, naj ravnajo v tako hudem nasprotju s človeško naravo.

Februarja 1945 so dobili organi za notranje zadeve pravico „pošiljati ljudi na prisilno delo brez sklepa sodišča“, kar so utemeljevali s tem, da gre za obliko mobilizacije; takrat so začela nastajati tudi prva kazenska taborišča (str. 194).

Politične kriterije so upoštevali tudi „pri delitvi socialne podpore [...] Upravičenost do podpore so ugotavljali na zborih volilcev“ (str. 197). Sramota!! Podpora bi morala temeljiti na potrebah, ne pa na političnih kriterijih ali zaslugah ali podobnih neumnostih.

KPJ je bila „prepričana, da bi se nacionalno vprašanje po zmagi revolucije v Italiji samo od sebe pravično rešilo“ (str. 119) in so v ta namen sodelovali z italijanskimi komunisti. Tudi „avstrijska KP je slovenski KP organizacijsko prepustila Koroško“ (str. 121). Vse to se mi zdi prav impresivno in sem zelo radoveden, kako bi se stvari razvijale, če bi po vojni Avstrija in Italija res postali komunistični. Pravzaprav dvomim, da bi nam prepustili kaj ozemlja, saj povojna zgodovina kaže, da so bile komunistične države praviloma strahovito nezaupljive druga do druge in so svoje nacionalne interese varovale še bolj ljubosumno kot kapitalistične države. No, saj že na str. 122 vidimo primere, da ti dobri odnosi z Italijani niso trajali dolgo.

Zanimiv je razdelek na str. 123-129, ki govori o raznih idejah, ki so se pojavile v zadnjem letu vojne na temo takšnih in drugačnih federacij in konfederacij raznih balkanskih držav.

Stalin in Churchill sta se ob neki priložnosti dogovorila, da si bosta delila vpliv v Jugoslaviji v razmerju 50:50, vendar so Britanci kmalu ugotovili, da iz tega ne bo nič; jugoslovanske oblasti so njihov vpliv zavračale, toliko raje pa so se obračale k Sovjetom (str. 117-8, 132-3, 152, 338-9).

V splošnem je torej ta prevzem oblasti potekal nekako tako, da so komunisti pač ves čas skrbeli za to, da so prišli njihovi ljudje na vse pomembne položaje, ovirali so delovanje drugih političnih strank in podobnih skupin, pod vpliv države so skušali spraviti čim več gospodarstva (npr. z zaseganjem premoženja ljudi, ki so jih obtožili vsakovrstnih zločinov proti NOG; str. 262), za dogovore npr. z zahodnimi zavezniki se niso prav dosti menili, nasprotnike je preganjala tajna služba (Ozna), itd. To me pravzaprav v mnogočem spominja na nacistični prevzem oblasti v 30. letih; očitno potekajo vse te reči po približno istem kopitu. Z zariplim vzklikanjem parol moraš narediti toliko hrupa, da postane normalna politična razprava nemogoča; popolnoma bizarne stvari moraš ponavljati s popolnoma resnim obrazom tako dolgo, da se začnejo ljudem dozdevati normalne; nato pa po eni strani z ukrepi na terenu (po možnosti s pomočjo nasilnih in na pol tajnih organizacij) zatiraš nasprotnike in potencialne nasprotnike, po drugi strani pa počasi in s primernim zavlačevanjem vpeljuješ potrebne spremembe v zakonodaji (str. 190) in to tako, da lahko tvoji naivni nasprotniki še karseda dolgo časa upajo (prim. str. 150), da se vse skupaj le ne bo končalo tako slabo, ko pa se zavedo, da se v resnici bo, je za njih že davno prepozno; če izvajaš kakšne volitve, si ne pomišljaj narediti iz njih farse (str. 260). Tudi v tej knjigi se vidi, da so še vse tja do leta 1946 razne predvojne stranke poskušale nekako delovati (str. 173), celo kakšen časopis so jim še dovolili kdaj pa kdaj izdajati; njihovo samostojno delovanje so sicer ovirali (str. 168, 351), so jim pa dovolili, da se poleg KPJ vključijo v nekakšno „ljudsko fronto“; istočasno pa so komunisti pridno likvidirali (str. 304), zapirali in konfiscirali vse, kar jim je bilo preveč v napoto, in v imenu varovanja pridobitev NOG (str. 312, 392) in preganjanja reakcije vztrajno ožili spekter še sprejemljivih političnih stališč (str. 333).

Po nekaj sporazumih med Titom in Šubašićem (predsednikom kraljeve vlade v izgnanstvu) leta 1944 je bila oblikovana skupna Tito-Šubašićeva vlada (str. 170), ki je vodila državo v letu 1945. Hecno se mi zdi, da je kralj tem dogovorom precej trdovratno nasprotoval (str. 140); pa menda ni nesrečnik mislil, da ima še kakšne resne možnosti za vrnitev na oblast? Kakorkoli že, Britanci so upali, da ta skupna vlada pomeni nekaj možnosti za ohranitev nekaterih demokratičnih svoboščin, vendar iz tega seveda ni bilo nič (str. 156). Tudi do kakšnih resnih kompromisov med komunisti in nekomunisti v tej vladi ni prihajalo (str. 319).

Jugoslavija je maja 1945 za nekaj časa zasedla obmejna ozemlja v Italiji in Avstriji in se tam ni ravno strahovito lepo obnašala (str. 220-224, 228-9).

Nemške vojne ujetnike so leta 1945 poslali na 2000 km dolg „sramotilni marš“ v Vojvodino, pri čemer jih je veliko seveda pomrlo (str. 247).

Uničevanje okupatorskih grobov in pokopališč (str. 256), „ker je potrebno čimprej odstraniti vse spomine na okupacijo“. Uh, še dobro, da so potem naslednjih 45 let ob vsaki priložnosti na veliko govorili o drugi svetovni vojni in z njo povezanih zadevah.

Vlada je hotela podreti žico okoli Ljubljane že 11. maja, kar pa so na zahtevo Ozne malo odložili, „sicer bi jo oviralo pri čiščenju“ (str. 260).

Prikladen način, kako izboljšati svoj rezultat na volitvah: vpelješ izgubo volilne pravice kot kazen za razne zločine, ki jih definiraš tako, da so jih tvoji politični nasprotniki večinoma krivi. (Str. 263, 300-1, 328, 332; oz. jih kar črtaš iz volilnih imenikov preprosto zato, ker se pač ne strinjajo s tabo: str. 344.) (Na lokalnih volitvah poleti 1945 je imelo volilno pravico okoli 60% prebivalstva; str. 301.) Na splošno se mi zdi jemati ljudem volilno pravico velika in popolnoma nedopustna svinjarija, pa ne glede na to, kaj so storili. Če se ne motim, te barbarske navade pri nas dandanes nimamo, ponekod po svetu pa jo še poznajo; najbolj znan primer so verjetno ZDA. Po drugi strani pa moram priznati, da me ta ukrep niti ne moti, če je uperjen proti primernim družbenim slojem. „Obsojenci za gospodarsko kolaboracijo so seveda izgubili tudi državljanske pravice, kar je pomenilo, da se premožnejši sloj slovenske družbe ni mogel udeležiti volitev leta 1945.“ (Str. 273.) Pa še prekleto prav jim je, golazni buržujski!!!

Kakorkoli že, gospodarsko kolaboracijo so definirali dovolj na široko, da so ji podjetja, ki so med vojno kakorkoli delovala, pravzaprav bolj težko ušla. Tako so sledili procesi, na katerih so zaplenili banke, tiskarne, razne tovarne in podobno (str. 276-7). Dovolj je bilo že, da „obdolženci niso storili vsega, kar je bilo v njihovi moči, da bi preprečili kolaboracijo“ (str. 277). Nek tovarnar se je v svoji obrambi skliceval na to, da je med vojno veliko denarno pomagal OF, na kar pa je sodišče odgovorilo, da je to očitno počel iz koristoljubnih namenov, torej ne šteje! (Str. 278.) Preganjali oz. preurejali so tudi društva (str. 284-6).

Zaplemba premoženja je kočljiva zadeva. Po eni strani je jasno, da je takšen ukrep nujen, če hočeš vzpostaviti komunistično družbo, saj drugače zlepa ne bi mogli doseči primerne stopnje enakosti med ljudmi; po drugi strani pa se to zelo rado izrodi v navadno plenjenje, s katerim se okoriščajo tvoji agentje, kot vidimo tudi na str. 265. Še posebej pa me živcira, da so za zaplembo premoženja tako radi uporabljali montirane sodne procese, namesto da bi vpeljali kak primeren zakon in premoženje zaplenili lepo po zakonu.

Komuniste sem si vedno predstavljal kot zagovornike pravic žensk, vendar je tu videti med njimi pogosto presenetljivo veliko nazadnjaških stališč. „Politbiro ni bil zadovoljen s pojavi feminizacije (npr. pri AFŽ), Kidričevo mnenje je bilo, naj se forsira tip ženske gospodinje (ne pa »frajle«) in bil proti »tem mladim puncam«.“ (Str. 296.) Podobno pravi Kraigher, „da je potrebno še naprej delovati proti raznim samostojnim ženskim organizacijam, kakor tudi proti feminizmu, ki se pojavlja v AFŽ“ (str. 374).

Pri volitvah jih je najbolj zanimala volilna udeležba, ki naj bi bila čim višja, volitve (in volilna kampanja) pa so bile predvsem sredstvo aktivacije množic; str. 302, 392. Priprava volilnih imenikov za volitve v ustavodajno skupščino je bila še ena bizarna zadeva: „te sezname so nato brali na t.i. ljudskih konferencah, kjer je vsakdo lahko predlagal, koga naj se zbriše z volilnega imenika, ker tega ni vreden“ (str. 343). Te volitve so bile tudi sicer hecna zadevščina. Opozicija je naznanila, da se jih „ne bo udeležila, ker ne more neovirano sodelovati v pripravah“ (str. 351). Tako je bilo mogoče izbirati le med listo „ljudske fronte“ (v kateri so bile poleg komunistov še razne druge skupine, seveda brez pravega vpliva) in „črno skrinjico“ brez liste (str. 361). To je spet bizarno: kaj naj bi imela vsaka stranka/lista svojo skrinjico, da potem volilec vrže svoj listek v eno od njih in pri tem lahko vsakdo vidi, v katero ga je vrgel? Pa kako lahko nekdo z resnim obrazom predlaga nekaj tako slaboumnega? Saj popolnoma razumem, da ti včasih pač ni do tega, da bi izvajal poštene volitve; ampak zakaj potem taka hinavščina, zakaj ne bi preprosto rekel: volitev ne bo, mi odločamo o vsem in konec? (Saj vem, zakaj: zato, da vidiš, kateri so glasovali za črno skrinjico, in tako veš, koga je treba preganjati; pa zato, ker ti je volilna kampanja primeren izgovor, da obmetavaš ljudi s svojo propagando.) Še vseeno pa ne vem točno, kako si je kdorkoli predstavljal ta koncept črne skrinjice: če bi ta recimo dobila večino (v nekaterih okrajih jo celo res je, str. 366), kaj bi se potem zgodilo? Bi ustavodajno skupščino sestavljala na pol prazna dvorana? Bi debatirali o ustavi stoli in gluhe stene? Aha, zdaj mi je prišlo nekaj na misel: če se glasuje tako, da vržeš glasovnico v skrinjico, potem ne obstaja koncept neveljavne glasovnice (kot pri dandanašnjih volitvah). Zato so tisti, ki se ne strinjajo s tabo, v skušnjavi, da sploh ne pridejo na volitve. Ker pa si želiš visoke volilne udeležbe, jim ponudiš črno skrinjico, tako da lahko pridejo in vendarle glasujejo, ne da bi te podprli. Še vseeno pa je vse to pošteno absurdno.

Te volitve so bile tako ali tako bolj farsa; str. 364-5 kaže številne primere zlorab, pretresanja glasov iz črne skrinjice v rdečo, ustrahovanja volilcev, itd. Malo sem sicer upal, da bodo tu kaj bolj dokumentirane tiste znane govorice, da so bile skrinjice zasnovane tako, da se je slišalo, ali si vrgel kroglico v črno ali v rdečo (ena da je bila tapecirana, druga pa ne), vendar so te reči tudi tukaj navedene zgolj kot govorice, brez kakšne dokumentarne podkrepitve. Sploh pa mi ni čisto jasno, zakaj bi bilo potrebno takšno kompliciranje, če pa sta dve ločeni skrinjici in lahko volilca opazuješ, v katero oddaja svojo kroglico? No, tehnično gledano bi bilo mogoče narediti tako, da daš roko notri in potem odvržeš kroglico levo ali desno, ne da bi se od zunaj videlo, na katero stran si jo oddal, vendar ta tehnologija ne podpira več kot dveh skrinjic, kar pa bi bilo teoretično gotovo treba podpreti. Kakorkoli že, v praksi so bila ta vprašanja tako ali tako nepomembna, saj so bili komunisti pač odločeni zmagati ne glede na mnenje volilcev. Poleg tega tudi ustavodajna skupščina ni imela posebnega vpliva: „Besedilo ustave je bilo pripravljeno že pred sklicem ustavodajne skupščine“ (str. 392). Razdelek o ustavi in debatah o njej je vseeno zanimiv (str. 392-400). Na svoji prvi seji je ustavodajna skupščina tudi razglasila Jugoslavijo za republiko (str. 368).

Volilno pravico pri teh volitvah v ustavodajno skupščino so imeli tudi mladoletniki, če so se borili v partizanih (str. 364). Vojaki so lahko glasovali v kraju, kjer so službovali, pri čemer je sistem dopuščal tudi zlorabe, da so glasovali po večkrat (str. 365).

Po teh volitvah so nekateri mislili, da bodo v KPJ prevladala zmernejša stališča o revoluciji, vendar se je KPJ v resnici pošteno lotila nadaljnjega utrjevanja svoje oblasti (str. 372). Vlogo OF so začeli zmanjševati in namesto nje poudarjati sindikate (str. 374-5, 384, 401-2); pod pretvezo zmanjševanja javne uprave so naganjali politično nezanesljive uslužbence (str. 377); prevzeli so nadzor nad tiskarnami (str. 387); preganjali so trgovce, tovarnarje in podobne ter jih z raznimi izgovori obsojali na (med drugim) zaplembo premoženja, da bi prišlo čim več gospodarstva v državne roke (str. 416-24). V kasnejših letih se je utrjevanje oblasti še nadaljevalo (str. 426)

„Množicam naj bi razložili, da nimajo pravilnega odnosa do oblasti, ker preveč nergajo proti zakonom in kritizirajo.“ (Str. 390-1.) Ho ho ho ho :-) Še ena izjava, ki si zasluži mesto v antologiji bizarnih izjav, s katerimi komunizem res ni skoparil. Sicer pa je to ena od redkih stvari, s katero bi se verjetno strinjali pripadniki oblasti v vseh političnih sistemih in ureditvah.

Pa še en prispevek za antologijo: Kidrič je „odgovoril tudi na vprašanje, kakšne pravice bo v bodoče imela nemška manjšina v Sloveniji. Dejal je, da ne bo imela nobenih, ker je ne bo.“ (Str. 408.)

V zadnjem poglavju je večkrat omenjen nek sodnik po imenu Heliodor Modic (alias Heli; str. 407, 416). Prav radoveden sem, kaj so imeli njegovi starši v mislih, ko so mu izbrali takšno ime. Zakaj bi šel človek poimenovat otroka po obskurnem grškem romanopiscu (pa čeprav je njegova Etiopska zgodba zelo prijetno branje)? No, mogoče ju je navdihnil kak drug Heliodor ali pa sama etimologija imena.

Na koncu knjige je tudi seznam literature, v katerem sem našel lepo število knjig, ki bi jih bilo tudi še zanimivo prebrati.

No, ta knjiga je zame po svoje zanimiva še iz nekega drugega razloga. Že ko sem jo začel brati, sem opazil, da je stavljena v palatinu, kar je sicer pri naših založbah redkost. Ko sem prišel do strani 12, sem opazil na enem mestu ldots, kjer bi morale biti tri pike, kar je bilo (skupaj s palatinom) zelo jasen namig, da je bila najbrž stavljena kar v TeXu (kar je pri naših založbah verjetno še večja redkost, če odmislimo kakšne matematike). Ob tem sem se spomnil, da so se neki moji znanci tam v zgodnjih devetdesetih ukvarjali s stavljenjem knjig v TeXu za Cankarjevo založbo. Ob pogledu na kolofon sem ugotovil, da je to res ena od tistih knjig, ki so jih postavili oni. To, da so imeli prste vmes računalnikarji, se vidi tudi na str. 92: „RimoKatoliške cerkve“ z veliko črko na sredi besede bi takrat na začetku devetdesetih verjetno lahko spravil skupaj le kak računalnikar.

BOOK: Albert Speer, "The Slave State"

Albert Speer: The Slave State: Heinrich Himmler's Masterplan for SS Supremacy. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981. 0297780131. (US edition: Infiltration, 0026128004.) xvi + 384 pp.

This is Speer's last book. I found it very dull, but I shouldn't complain as I have been warned about it both by a review on amazon.com as well as by several passages in Gitta Sereny's biography of Speer (see esp. the last section of that book, titled “Postscript”). (Another proof of its dulness is that, as far as I have been able to determine, this English translation of it has only been issued in hardcover, but not in paperback.) Despite these warnings, I decided to try reading the book because of its fascinating topic: the efforts of the SS to infiltrate other institutions and organize a state within the state, preparing to run its own independent economic empire in the post-war period. Despite its dulness, the book contains several interesting passages; however, to truly enjoy it one would have to have the sort of fondness for WW2-era German bureaucratic intrigue and the technicalities of running a war economy that I simply cannot imagine anybody truly possessing rather than merely affecting (this reminds me somewhat of the anecdote about Diana Mosley in her seventies, reading “two dusty tomes in German Schrift of the life of the Kaiser” why? “Oh, darling, the jokes!” — as related by Selina Hastings in a preface to Diana's autobiography). Anyway, the “masterplan” promised by the subtitle of the book turns out to be, predictably enough, nothing very exciting: it simply consists of many small steps to increase the influence of Himmler and the SS, and none of these small steps is particularly interesting by itself. Despite all this, many passages in the book are quite interesting, as will be seen below, and in the end I don't really regret having read this book. (I must also admit that the first half of the book is on average considerably more dull than the second half. Alternatively, perhaps I simply got used to the dulness and went into shallow-reading mode, effortlessly disregarding most of the boring stuff.)

There is an interesting observation on p. 4 that most of the economic successes of Germany in the years after Hitler's rise to power were due to the officials and technocrats that had already been employed in those positions during the Weimar period, or even before WW1. The Nazi party at the time of its rise to power included few people with skills and leadership abilities necessary to administer the economy; those Nazi “old fighters” who were given responsible positions in the administration were often more likely to block progress than to encourage it.

Himmler tried to employ concentration camp prisoners for armament production, but the SS was not very good at organizing the work or interacting with the rest of the economy (ch. 3). Productivity of the prisoners was very low (p. 35). Later prisoners were employed in ordinary factories, and the SS tried to use this as an excuse to demand that SS officers be installed as managers wherever prisoners work (p. 227).

One of the ways in which Himmler tried to spread his influence was to offer people in influential positions “honorary” SS ranks. This put him (being the supreme leader of the SS) in a good position to try issuing commands or requests to them, requiring them to follow his advice or keep him informed about developments in their area. See e.g. pp. 17-18, 63, 177-8.

After pages and pages of dry, technical writing about various bureaucratic intrigues, there comes a description of a dinner in the office of Walther Funk, the Reich Bank president. The contrast with the boring pages before and after it could hardly be greater. Speer is as thrilled as Ali Baba in the robbers' cave and goes into a fair amount of detail concerning the extremely luxurious furniture and the ridiculously opulent dishes (“soup of pressed pheasant meat”). Pp. 69-70.

Chapter 7, “SS Economic Ideology” (pp. 76-84), is extremely interesting. (However, this chapter is really more about Nazi economic ideology than specifically SS ideology.) These opinions about economy were widely supported by the early Nazis, but Hitler eventually realized they aren't practicable and didn't insist on pursuing them any further (he probably also realized that unless he gave up these opinions, the leaders of big business wouldn't support him, without which his party's rise to power would be impossible); however, they apparently still had many supporters (e.g. in SS circles) even in the WW2 years. These opinions are opposed to capitalism with its emphasis on efficiency and mass production, with the argument that this crushes individuality and widens the gap between rich and poor. Socialism or communism of the Soviet type is of course not seen as a solution for this, since it after all is also obsessed by efficiency and mass production. Instead the Nazi economic ideology calls for a greater individualism in work, and a tighter integration of the work and the worker's life: their ideal is the romantic vision of a farmer connected with his soil rather than the industrial worker alienated from his work. (I guess something along the lines of the arts and crafts movement would be more to their liking.) There are several problems with this vision, however. In particular, mass production and efficiency mean that fewer workers are needed to produce a certain amount of items than if the same had been produced by medieval-style artisans. Nor is it necessary that the mass-produced items be of poorer quality than those produced by master craftsmen (see Speer's remark on p. 80). Of course mass production and efficiency in industry lead to depersonalization, dehumanization, alienation and other horrible effects, but in my opinion the real tragedy of mass production is that, without proper guidance (and sadly no such guidance exists in a typical capitalist society), humankind is unable to use mass production to its fullest advantage. If some technological development leads to an increase of efficiency which allows five times as many items to be produced with the same amount of effort as before, the proper thing to do would be to keep on living in the same way as before but to reduce working hours from eight to 1.6 per day; or perhaps to 2 per day, with the extra 0.4 hours producing a surplus that could be used to improve the standard of living or be invested in further technological progress. Instead, what happens is that people are still made to work eight hours a day, but only a fifth as many of them are needed, so the rest lose their jobs and must find employment somewhere else (if they are lucky); or possibly all the people will be kept in employment but five times as many items will be produced, and efforts will have to be made to persuade the consumers to actually consume five times as much as before even though this is much more than they really need. (Needless to say, having to do five times less work would make people not five, but fifty times happier, whereas having to work as much as before but having five times as much worthless junk as before will not make them five times happier, but probably rather five times more miserable.) This leads to the lamentable state of the economy that we can observe nowadays, when people, despite all the technological progress of the last century or two, are still working as busily as ever, and the only advantage in comparison with the past is that we now produce more stuff with the same amount of work. Thus the current economy is producing huge amounts of completely unnecessary goods and services — instead of wasting people's time on the production of these things, they should be given more spare time and their quality of life would be vastly improved. Technological progress might slow down a bit because of this but this wouldn't really be a problem because most technological progress nowadays is illusory anyway and doesn't really solve any of the important problems in life. Thus, the solution for the present deplorable state of the economy is not in a return to the romantic artisan's approach to work (for the artisan was busily working all the time just as well as the workers of today) but in employing the technology of mass production to liberate people from work, rather than merely to shower them with worthless trinkets that they don't really need (until the advertisers dupe them into thinking they need them) and that they could in fact quite happily do without.

(Incidentally, as Speer comments on pp. 82-83, it is really bizarre to find these humanitarian concerns about the fate of workers in the age of mass-production among people who at the same time cheerfully organized and carried out the murder of millions.)

Speer often encountered this sort of romantic opposition to mass production and technology, even during the WW2 years when it was clear that efforts like his to increase efficiency were in fact quite successful at increasing the production of various important branches of the war economy (and these increases in production were vital for the German war effort: “if it hadn't been for Speer, Hitler would have had to give up at least a year earlier than he did”, Gitta Sereny in The German Trauma, p 266). A typical example is the opposition of Hitler and several other leading Nazis to the idea of alleviating the labour shortage by employing women (p. 83; there had been no such opposition in e.g. Britain or the U.S.).

Another problem with this Nazi romantic ideology of the economy is that they couldn't help defending it with ridiculously nebulous and biologistic verbiage. Instead of saying that mass production and efficiency are simply bad because nobody in their right mind wants to slave away at a conveyor belt amidst the din of a huge factory all day long, they had to go on and on about the need to “preserve and develop the substance of our biological values” and “achieve that order which, deep down, allows the development of human strength to be identical with man's mission towards his God” (both quotes are from p. 77, by Otto Ohlendorf, an SS Brigade Commander who worked at the economic ministry in 1942). This second quote is, as far as I'm concerned, completely devoid of content; I have no idea what it is trying to say, and I doubt that the author had any idea either. The first quote seems to stem from a kind of silly Lamarckian understanding of evolution: work in a factory sucks, therefore our genes will get corrupted if we let our people work in factories for a few generations. This makes about as much sense as the Victorian concerns that masturbation leads to hereditary defects. They both stem from a very naive understanding of genetics and heredity.

Anyway, despite all these concerns, I still feel much sympathy for this romantic opposition to the horrible dehumanizing industry of the modern age. It is, at the same time, an illustration of the fact that (though it seems somewhat surprising at first) romanticism is one of the principal inspirations of Nazi ideology. I shall have to read more about these connections at some point; for now, there are a few relevant chapters in Russell's History of Western Philosophy; there's also an interesting essay about Rudolf Steiner and ecofascism. David Brin also wrote a very interesting essay (several, in fact) about the contrast between backward-looking romanticism and forward-looking enlightenment. My opinions are uncomfortably torn apart between these two opposite poles; like the romantics, I hate the present state of the world and consider it sordid and soulless (well, it isn't quite right for me to say “soulless” since I don't believe in the existence of souls, but you get the point anyway); and I don't feel optimistic about the future the way Brin does in his essay; but at the same time I'm quite clearly aware of the fact that looking back in nostalgia to an imagined romantic golden age of the past is completely silly, as no matter how bad the present is, most of the past was, by and large, considerably worse. Perhaps my problem is not so much an excessive fondness for romanticism but rather mere misanthropy; I wish there was some way I could regain some optimism about people and some hope of a genuine progress in the future... Why o why must democracy always appear so sordid, and despotism so appealing? Why can't I stop despising democracy even though I am rationally quite aware that life in despotism would be even worse?

There are a few amusing typos: “In the curse of time” (p. 94); “as shone by his positive response” (p. 156).

Another very interesting chapter is Ch. 11 (pp. 133-52), which contains many examples of Himmler's meddling in matters of research and technology, matters which he was neither responsible for nor competent in. It is truly a tragedy that the likes of Hitler and Himmler reached such powerful positions; in a luckier world, Himmler would have made a passable provincial schoolmaster, dull and pedantic but essentially harmless in the wider scheme of things, whiling away his spare time by testing out his half-baked ideas a la Bouvard and Pécuchet and writing the occasional letter to the local newspaper. Anyway, here are some of the ridiculous ideas mentioned in chapter 11 (they didn't all originate from Himmler, but he at least took them seriously and used his influence to have experts waste their time evaluating them): switching off electrical devices remotely by “removing the insulating effect of the atmosphere” (p. 146); “manufacture of alcohol” from “the exhaust fumes from bakery chimneys” (p. 147); “obtaining oil from geraniums” (p. 148; Himmler immediately suggested that a hectare of geraniums should be planted for purposes of experimentation); producing high-octane gasoline out of fir tree roots (pp. 148-9; this has been practiced in Japan but the roots had to age under ground for several years); generators for extracting fuel from peat (p. 180); Himmler's brain was “indefatigably preoccupied with new ideas” (p. 220); to protect the factories from allied bombing, he proposed the construction not only of underground but even of underwater facilities (pp. 220-2). Himmler was also meddling in a naval project for a faster kind of boat (p. 140) and trying to set up a “high-frequency research institute [. . .] at the concentration camp of Dachau. [. . .] The institute has exclusively prisoners for its employees [including the director]”, etc., etc. (p. 139).

The SS was also trying to take over as many factories in the occupied East as possible, more than was planned originally, all with a view to securing its own standalone economic empire for the post-war period (p. 155). This idea of securing a standalone industrial and economic basis for the SS was not just a result of the ambitiousness of Himmler or other SS leaders, but was also supported by Hitler who felt that his successors might not be as favourable towards the SS as he was, which means it might not be good for the SS to rely too much on money coming from the state's budget (p. 3).

There are several examples of inefficiency due to silly micromanagement. For example, a number of high-ranking SS officials wasted much time and ink on the question of drafting a few dozen people who had been employed in the Todt construction organization (p. 162).

Machine reporting using the “Hollerith system” is mentioned on pp. 167-8; finally I see somebody else besides Edwin Black (see his fascinating book, IBM and the Holocaust) mention the use of IBM/Hollerith technology (punched cards, etc.) in Nazi Germany.

There are a few instances of splendid sarcasm. Here Speer comments while quoting one of Himmler's letters: “I would under no circumstances wish to do anything illegal. [an astonishing resolution for Himmler.]” (P. 189.) And on p. 191, referring to Hitler: “He asked who was responsible for the planting—a cogent question, given the chaos of jurisdictions.”

An interesting paragraph on p. 190 suggests what sort of plans might have been considered by the SS regarding the colonies in the post-war period: “building gigantic concentration camp factories in the colonies after the war”. European concentration camp inmates would be transferred there to work in mines and construction projects: “This will keep the settlement space in Greater Germany clean. Government plantations will provide work for the colored peoples.”

Himmler was quite successful in infiltrating the rocket program (ch. 15). (Towards the end of the war he eventually achieved control over all armament production, but by then “there was no more armaments industry”, p. 209.) Incidentally, Speer says of the rocket program that “after the war, Western experts confirmed that we had a three-year lead in these areas of technology” (p. 202). However, the A-4 (a.k.a. V-2) rocket wasn't of much use because the Germans had no atomic bomb, and the rocket could therefore only deliver conventional explosives (p. 216). (It is, incidentally, a little bit disconcerting to see Speer mention this so lightly, in passing, as if it was no big deal. This makes it quite clear that if the Nazis had the atomic bomb, they would have made ample use of it. But then it's true that the Allies were planning to use it against Germany as well, and would have probably done it if Germany hadn't been defeated by the time the bomb was ready. And they weren't too hesitant to use it on Japan either, which use could possibly have been avoided. I guess it's due to the “total war” mentality. Total war and nuclear weapons definitely aren't a good combination.) Himmler suggested that the rockets be assembled by concentration camp prisoners, to prevent any information about this project from leaking out to the enemies (p. 205); this work then proceeded in terrible conditions in the infamous Dora camp (p. 212). Incidentally, according to a book about the Dora camp that I read a couple of years ago (I forgot the title), the camp inmates who worked on the rockets often did their best to sabotage the effort, with the result that many rockets failed to take off or, if they did take off, to reach their intended destination.

As the German military and economic situation was becoming more and more desperate towards the end of the war, efforts were sometimes made to speed things up and cut through red tape by the appointment of special “plenipotentiaries”. This led to a proliferation of absurdly pompous official titles whose bearers were in practice often largely impotent as the economy was collapsing all around them and nothing could be done anyway. Thus we hear of a “Plenipotentiary for Special Questions of Chemical Production in the Four-Year Plan” (p. 222) and a “Plenipotentiary of the Führer for Jet Engine Aircraft” (p. 242).

In the last years of the war, some of the factories involved in armament production were transferred to subterranean facilities to protect them from allied bombing. However, it was too late for this to have any significant effects; if little else, the allied bombing also caused heavy damage to the transportation network and moving the factories was useless (p. 237).

The SS policies in occupied Poland (ch. 19) were split between two directions. “There were two trends struggling against one another in the top SS leadership” (p. 275). On the one hand they were killing Jews in large numbers even though all sorts of other agencies (Speer's ministry, the German army, as well as Frank's administration of occupied Poland) were complaining that this deprives the war industry of valuable workers and causes delays in production; on the other hand they used the anti-Jewish policies as an excuse to remove Jewish workers from ordinary factories and set them to work in concentration camps instead, where they were under SS control (pp. 264-5, 274) and would help establish an independent economic basis for the SS in the post-war period.

The Epilogue contains some of the most fascinating passages in the book. Speer describes Hitler's and Himmler's vision of the post-war SS activities in the occupied East. A vast slave labour programme would be used to simultaneously reduce the Slavic population of those territories and to construct the towns and villages that would be necessary to colonize the area by the Germans. The existing cities, such as Moscow and Leningrad, would be simply destroyed. “This empire of slaves, which was to stretch all the way to the Urals, would be basic energy source of a Europe that had to prepare to conquer the greatest enemy: the United States of America.” (P. 202.) Using planned budget expenditures and various calculations, Speer was able to estimate the size of the programme and the number of people involved. As many as 14.5 million slave labourers might be involved at any time, and due to high mortality the actual number of people involved over the planned 20-year duration of the programme would be at least twice as high (pp. 201-203). Comparing these figures with the numbers of workers that were already successfully managed by the German administration during the war, “we see that this project was not really impossible” (p. 203). (And besides, it certainly affords splendid scope for some fascinating what-if scenarios!)

There is, however, one encouraging thing when it comes to reading these sordid tales of the grandiose Nazi slavery programme: namely that they shock us. This is a sign of progress. When we hear that the Babylonians or the Egyptians enslaved the whole Jewish population, we don't think much of it. When we hear that the Romans completely obliterated Carthage, or that Caesar exterminated rebellious Gallic tribes, we hardly bat an eyelid. When we hear of the Great Wall of China being built by slaves, or by peasants or prisoners who were little better off than slaves, we are impressed by the magnitude of the project, but again fundamentally little perturbed. But when we hear that somebody proposed to perpetrate these same kinds of horrors in our own time, in the twentieth century (and indeed on the vastly larger scale that is now made possible by modern technology and modern bureaucracy), we are shocked. What is shocking about this is not that somebody proposed to hold 14.5 million people in slavery over a territory covering half of Europe (things weren't necessarily all that much better in some parts of history, when feudalism and slavery were commonplace all over Europe and Asia); what is shocking is that somebody proposed to do it now, recently, in the 20th century — to do it with the aid of the railroad, the electric-wire fence and the Hollerith tabulator — and thereby proposed to bring into the world a weird mixture of the modern and the ancient or medieval elements. It is this uncanny mixture which makes the whole proposal so shocking and revolting. Although enslavement and extermination have been a “normal” part of the human condition for most of recorded history, we are shocked to see them occasionally make a reappearance in the modern times. We no longer expect them; we are no longer used to them; we no longer consider them normal. And that is a very encouraging thing.

I bought a second-hand copy of this book but it had practically no signs of damage, except that some previous owner or reader inserted a newspaper clipping about the death of a certain SS general Karl Wolff, who is mentioned in several places in the book. Well, on reaching p. 241, this previous reader must have had an accute attack of pedantry, for he/she added as many as three corrections on this page. The surname of one Kammler was misspelled as Kammer, and the rank of a certain Mataré should apparently be Obersturmbannführer rather than a mere Obersturmführer. I was rather fascinated by this last correction, for the man certainly seems very obscure (and is not even mentioned in the index at the end of the book). Apparently the previous owner of this book had quite a detailed knowledge of these SS bureaucrats. Two further corrections of the same sort appear on pp. 269 and 287. On the other hand, the typo on p. 289 (“expressng”) went uncorrected. Shame.

Incidentally, this book has a curious approach to SS ranks: some of them are translated (e.g. “brigade commander” and “standard commander”) while others are left in the original German (e.g. “Obergruppenführer”).

P.S. Don't make the same mistake I did in buying a copy of the U.K. edition — judging from the entries at ABE, the U.S. edition can be had much more cheaply (e.g. $6-10 instead of $30-50). Nor is there any reason to prefer the U.K. edition on grounds of collectibility, since (as far as I have been able to determine) the U.S. edition is the true first English-language edition of this book anyway.

BOOK: James W. Gerard, "Face to Face with Kaiserism"

James W. Gerard: Face to Face with Kaiserism. New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918. (E-text.)

Gerard was the U.S. ambassador in Germany in the years 1913-1917. He later published two volumes of memoirs about his experiences, first My Four Years in Germany and then Face to Face with Kaiserism. Incidentally, the WW1 Document Archive web site where I found the e-texts of these two books also contains several other promising-sounding titles.

Gerard's main theme in this book is to describe the system and conditions in Germany, and to a smaller extent in other European countries, and to help persuade his American readers that the war must be taken seriously, that Germany's imperialist ambitions were practically limitless and that, if the U.S. hadn't entered into the war on their own, Germany would certainly attack them once its war with the entente was over.

This book was quite interesting to read for several reasons. Firstly there are numerous interesting descriptions and anecdotes of the way of life and the social system in Wilhelmine Germany. Many of these things must have appeared curious to U.S. readers in Gerard's time, and they appear even more curious now. Secondly there is Gerard's charming enthusiasm for the traditional U.S. ideals of freedom, democracy, and opportunity, as opposed to the authoritarianism, rigidity, and oppresion of the Prussian monarchy. It was nice to be reminded in this way that, for most of its history, the U.S. was an example to other countries and their oppressed inhabitants, something that many people in other countries looked up to and whose democratic ideals they hoped to emulate. Nowadays the U.S. is so widely (and rightfully) reviled as the abominable imperialist arch-bully it is, that it's good to be reminded occasionally that this is really only a relatively recent development, and that for most of its history the U.S. was only one of many aggressive imperialists in the world, and by no means the worst one.

Ch. 1 is a nice sketch of Kaiser Wilhelm, who is portrayed as a capable and energetic person but unfortunately also a shamelessly autocratic and imperialist ruler. Gerard is surely right in opposing autocratic monarchy (or “the king business”, as he terms it), but sometimes his anti-monarchic and pro-democratic sentiments carry him a little too far, such as when he responds to President Wilson's question about the war, “Why does all this horror come into this world?” with the absurd over-simplification: “Mr. President, it is the king business.” As if democratic countries weren't just as capable of conducting an imperialist foreign policy that leads to war! It's true that starting a war is perhaps easier for an autocrat who doesn't need to take the opinion of the people into account, but any sensible autocrat will take care to get the public on his side by the means of propaganda anyway, and the same method will also work in a democratic country: the opinion of the people and their representatives in democratic institutions can always be influenced by warmongering propaganda by those who consider a war to be in their interest.

There is a very interesting passage in ch. 1 suggesting that, after the death of Francis Joseph, Wilhelm intended to prevent his successor from becoming Emperor of Austria, so that only Wilhelm would be an Emperor, while Austria, Hungary, Bohemia, and the other Habsburg lands would be ruled by kings or princes under Wilhelm's influence.

Besides the Kaiser, the main responsibility for the war must fall on the German General Staff, particularly on Hindenburg and Ludendorff (ch. 2).

Lèse-majesté, i.e. publishing statements considered offensive to (or indeed merely critical of) the Emperor or his family, was quite a serious crime in Wilhelmine Germany. There are many examples in ch. 4, showing how the courts were very quick to interpret a statement as offensive and use this excuse to persecute journalists and other critics of the government.

One reason why the Prussian Junkers, i.e. the large landowners, were so supportive of the war is that “they get, even with a high ‘stop price,’ three times as much as formerly for their agricultural products and pay only a small sum, sixty pfennig daily, for the prisoners of war who now work their fields” (ch. 6).

In several passages, Gerard calls for protectionist measures to be introduced in the U.S. to protect their chemical industry from German competition, as in Germany these industries are organized in trusts and therefore manage to prevent smaller competitors elsewhere from entering these branches of business (ch. 5). I personally have always been an ardent supporter of protectionism, but it is sort of sad to observe how the opinions regarding protectionism change in accordance with economic interests. A hundred years ago the U.S. were keen supporters of protectionism to help their economy grow, while now they are the most outspoken supporters of liberalisation of trade because it would prevent other countries from protecting themselves from U.S. competition! And of course any other country would do just the same given the opportunity.

Apparently, despite the growing anti-U.S. sentiment in Germany (chs. 5-6), many Americans, particularly U.S. newspaper reporters in Germany, remained strongly pro-German, and some even interfered with Gerard's diplomatic business (see esp. the end of ch. 6).

In chs. 7-8 there are some interesting observations of Germany's plans to attack the U.S. after the war (assuming that Germany would conclude a reasonable peace in the West, perhaps even keep Belgium and some bits of France, and keep its large territorial gains in the East). Germany also had designs to gain influence in Mexico and thus obtain a foothold in the Western hemisphere. Chapter 14 also discusses the German war aims; in particular, after all the costs and sacrifices of the war, any peace proposal that would not allow Germany to keep some of the occupied territory in the west would be quite unacceptable to Germany; it would also be difficult for the autocratic system to stay in power if it could not please the people by portraying the war as a success and a victory. (And indeed, as events have shown, there was a republican revolution in Germany following its defeat in the war. Gerard suggests in ch. 27 that even if the war ends with a German success, it won't be possible to oppress the workers to the same degree as before: having fought in the trenches, they would be ready to stand up for their rights after their war. I wonder if it would have really turned out that way, however; after all, in Stalin's Soviet Union there was a temporary loosening of the state oppression during the WW2 but a renewed clampdown after the war was over; see e.g. Beevor's Berlin: The Downfall.) If it were successful in the war, Germany would also attempt to gain colonies on other continents and obtain influence in territories not under its direct control. However, this should not be considered simply an influence of a handful of warmongering writers, but rather a genuine expression of the interests of Germany's ruling class: “I never found a German of the ruling class who had read anything written by Treitschke, Nietzsche or Bernhardi.”

There is a curious observation in ch. 7: “State Socialism makes advances over here. A proposition is now discussed to compel the young men who are earning large wages to save a part thereof.” Perhaps I shouldn't be surprised that an American like Gerard is suspicious about such a measure but it sounds like an eminently reasonable proposition to me. In fact I would go one step further; rather than making them save the money it should be taken away from them and redistributed to those with smaller incomes.

The German Empire much boasted of its culture and its intentions of exporting it abroad, but ch. 9 paints a much more dismal picture. “I know of no class in Germany which really enjoys life.” Bureaucratic efficiency made possible by the non-democratic political system, long hours and low wages in factories, a strong army as the result of a militaristic society — these were the chief aspects of the civilization of the German Empire. The subsequent chapters (10-13) contain many other interesting observations about various aspects of life, culture, and society of the German Empire. “The workingmen of Germany are more brutal than those of England, France and America, but this is because of the low wages they receive, and because they feel the weight of the caste system.” (ch. 13).

Ch. 14 contains some very interesting observations of the changes in the character of Germany and the German people. “That older, kindlier Germany was the nation tempered and softened by the suffering of the Napoleonic wars. [. . .] but all was changed by the successful wars of Prussia that gave Prussia the leadership, the right to rule Germany. Then, with the end of the Franco-Prussian war, came a period of material prosperity, the rush of the population to the cities, and the building of great manufactories, of enormous shipping interests, of powerful banking institutions, of trusts and combinations which marked the Germany of 1914. [. . .] the grasping, successful Prussian of 1914 was far removed from the ruined, chastened Prussian of 1810.” German history of the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century has made Germany somewhat of a synonym for an aggressive, warlike, bloodthirsty country; it is always good to be reminded that this has not always been the case. I remember how surprised I was then I first read in Tolstoy's War and Peace (book 1, ch. 27) a character's disparaging remark about Germany: “Buonaparte was born with a silver spoon in his mouth. He has got splendid soldiers. Besides he began by attacking Germans. And only idlers have failed to beat the Germans. Since the world began everybody has beaten the Germans. They beat no one—except one another. He made his reputation fighting them.” At the time I mostly thought of Germany as the powerful warlike country responsible for the two world wars, and the idea of Germans as having been defeated by practically everyone was most suprising to me. However, there is much truth in this if we look at German history; much of the time the Holy Roman Empire was a weak, ineffectual entity, plagued by civil wars and certainly not able to project much power abroad. And in the post-WW2 period, Germany has again become a peaceful country that dedicates its energy to economic rather than military success. Perhaps indeed the period from the middle of the nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century will eventually turn out to be but an anomaly in German history, rather than a typical period.

Ch. 15 is an interesting presentation of Austria-Hungary, but it also contains this bizarre report: “In Styria, in the mountainous districts of Austria to the west of Hungary, lives a race differing again from all the others, a mountain race supposed to be eaters of arsenic, a drug which they believe gives them a good complexion and stamina for mountain climbing.”

In ch. 18 he mentions “the war cry of Verdun, ‘They shall not pass!’” This reminded me of Gandalf's similar exclamation “You shall not pass!” in The Lord of the Rings; I wonder if Tolkien was influenced by the Verdun motto. He must have been at least aware of it, as he had fought on the western front during WW1.

In ch. 20 he writes about German spies, who are experts at their craft. “The easiest way to baffle them is to write nothing that cannot be published to the world.”

In ch. 22 there are some nice idealistic statements about doing diplomacy in an open-handed and public way rather than secretly and behind the curtains. “I think that the Germans just now are beginning to realise that I always told them the truth and treated them fairly, a procedure, I admit, far more disconcerting and disturbing to them than the most subtle wiles and moves of the old diplomacy.” This is another touching reminder of the days when the U.S. felt they could be an example of better and more accountable conduct, particularly in contrast to the tired corrupt old imperialistic powers (cf. also Wilson's noble efforts at the Paris peace conference, as opposed to the British and French inclination towards bartering pieces of territory like horses on the market). It is nice to remember these better old days now that the U.S. is merely the biggest bully in the playground and hardly a shining example to other countries.

A certain German regiment uses black uniforms with death's-head symbols because “Friedrich II [. . .] utilised the black funeral hangings at the elaborate funeral of his father to make uniforms for this regiment” (ch. 23).

“The Berlin lower classes are renowned for their dry wit and they find much to amuse them in the tasteless statues and monuments of Berlin.” (Ch. 23.) This corroborates the descriptions in Antony Beevor's Berlin: The Downfall.

Ch. 21 is also very interesting and shows many examples of strong pro-German feeling in the U.S., German influence in schools, etc.

All in all, I found this book to be very interesting and readable. Some time ago I also read Gerard's earlier book, My Four Years in Germany, which was also quite interesting. If I decide to read it again I'll write a post here about that book as well.